How the exam works
The exam at a glance
A specialty-level exam for people who secure AWS workloads. Questions are scenarios: a company has a security requirement plus constraints (least effort, lowest cost, no code changes, across every account). Often two answers would work; pick the one that meets every constraint. The guide targets the equivalent of 3–5 years of experience securing cloud solutions.
Question types
| Type | What you do |
|---|---|
| Multiple choice | Pick 1 correct answer out of 4. |
| Multiple response | Pick 2 or more correct answers out of 5 or more. All must be right. |
| Ordering New in C03 | Pick the correct 3–5 steps and put them in the right order (for example, the steps to contain a compromised instance). All-or-nothing. |
| Matching New in C03 | Match 3–7 prompts to responses (for example, threats to the service that stops each). Every pair must be right. |
Scoring is compensatory: you only need to pass overall, not each domain. The 15 unscored questions aren't marked, so treat every question as real. Delivered at a Pearson VUE test center or online proctored.
Where the points are
| Domain | Weight | Approx. scored questions |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Detection | 16% | ~8 |
| 2. Incident Response | 14% | ~7 |
| 3. Infrastructure Security | 18% | ~9 |
| 4. Identity and Access Management | 20% | ~10 |
| 5. Data Protection | 18% | ~9 |
| 6. Security Foundations and Governance | 14% | ~7 |
IAM is now the single biggest domain (up from 16% to 20%). Policy evaluation logic, cross-account access and troubleshooting "access denied" are worth the most study time.
How SCS-C02 domains map to SCS-C03
| SCS-C02 domain | % | SCS-C03 domain | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Threat Detection and Incident Response | 14% | 1. Detection | 16% |
| 2. Security Logging and Monitoring | 18% | 2. Incident Response | 14% |
| 3. Infrastructure Security | 20% | 3. Infrastructure Security | 18% |
| 4. Identity and Access Management | 16% | 4. Identity and Access Management | 20% |
| 5. Data Protection | 18% | 5. Data Protection | 18% |
| 6. Management and Security Governance | 14% | 6. Security Foundations and Governance | 14% |
The old "threat detection + IR" and "logging + monitoring" domains were split by job: everything about seeing problems is now Domain 1 (Detection), everything about acting on them is Domain 2 (Incident Response).
What's new and what's gone
Added skills New in C03
| Skill | What it adds | Where |
|---|---|---|
| 2.2.3 | Validate findings from AWS security services to assess scope and impact | Domain 2 |
| 3.1.4 | Edge integrations: ingest data in OCSF format, third-party AWS WAF rules | Domain 3 |
| 3.2.7 | Guardrails for generative AI apps (OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications) | Domain 3 |
| 5.1.3 | Inter-resource encryption in transit (EMR, EKS, SageMaker AI, Nitro) | Domain 5 |
| 5.3.3 | Imported key material vs AWS-generated key material | Domain 5 |
| 5.3.4 | Masking sensitive data (CloudWatch Logs data protection, SNS message data protection) | Domain 5 |
| 5.3.5 | Keys and certificates across one or many Regions (multi-Region KMS keys, Private CA) | Domain 5 |
Removed from the blueprint
- AWS Security Finding Format (ASFF) and the AWS Security Incident Response Guide as named items
- CloudTrail log format and components
- Host-based security (host firewalls, OS hardening as its own topic)
- Reachability Analyzer, TCP/IP fundamentals (TCP vs UDP, OSI model), network connectivity troubleshooting
- Policy element basics (Principal, Action, Resource, Condition) as a stand-alone skill
- TLS concepts, cross-Region networking with private and public VIFs, S3 static website hosting
"Removed" means not tested as its own skill. You still need policy elements to read a policy, and TLS basics to pick a load balancer security policy.
Services AWS changed after the guide was written
| Service or feature in the guide | What changed | Current replacement |
|---|---|---|
| Amazon CodeGuru Security (skill 3.2.6) | Retired Support ended November 20, 2025 | Amazon Inspector code security (SAST, dependency (SCA) and IaC scanning of GitHub/GitLab repos) and Amazon Q Developer security scans |
| AWS Audit Manager (skill 6.3.2) | Maintenance No new customers from April 30, 2026 | AWS Config conformance packs (AWS's own recommendation), Security Hub CSPM standards; AWS Artifact for AWS's reports |
| AWS CloudTrail Lake (in-scope list) | Maintenance No new customers from April 30, 2026 | Amazon CloudWatch (AWS's recommended migration; OCSF/OTel support), or Athena over the trail's S3 bucket, or Security Lake |
| SNS message data protection (skill 5.3.4) | Maintenance No new customers from April 30, 2026 | CloudWatch Logs data protection policies for logs; mask in the publisher/subscriber (Lambda), Macie for data at rest |
| S3 Glacier Vault Lock (skill 5.2.2) | Maintenance The original Amazon Glacier vault service closed to new customers November 7, 2025 | S3 Object Lock on S3 Glacier storage classes (fully available), AWS Backup Vault Lock |
| Systems Manager Incident Manager | Maintenance Closed to new customers November 7, 2025 | Systems Manager OpsCenter (named in the guide), EventBridge + SSM Automation runbooks |
| Shield Advanced automatic application-layer mitigation | Superseded from March 26, 2026 (legacy stays available to existing customers) | AWS WAF Anti-DDoS managed rule group, which mitigates HTTP floods within seconds |
In-scope and out-of-scope services
AWS's note on the list matters: security affects all AWS services. Many services aren't listed because the service itself is out of scope, but its security features are in scope. You won't be asked how to set up S3 replication, but you might be asked about an S3 bucket policy.
| Category | In scope (SCS-C03) |
|---|---|
| Analytics | Athena, OpenSearch Service |
| Application integration | SNS, Step Functions |
| Compute | API Gateway, EC2 (including EC2 Image Builder and EC2 Instance Connect), EKS, EMR, Lambda, Data Lifecycle Manager |
| Developer tools | AWS Fault Injection Service |
| Internet of Things | AWS IoT Core |
| Machine learning | Amazon Bedrock, CodeGuru Security, Amazon Q Business, Amazon Q Developer, SageMaker AI |
| Management & governance | CloudFormation, CloudTrail, CloudTrail Lake, CloudWatch, Config, Control Tower, Managed Grafana, Organizations, Resilience Hub, RAM, Service Catalog, Systems Manager, Trusted Advisor, User Notifications, Well-Architected Tool |
| Networking & content delivery | Application Recovery Controller, VPC (Network Access Analyzer, network ACLs, security groups, VPC endpoints, Site-to-Site VPN, Flow Logs, Verified Access), Client VPN, CloudFront, Verified Permissions, Route 53 (including Resolver DNS Firewall), Direct Connect, Elastic Load Balancing, Transit Gateway |
| Security, identity & compliance | Artifact, Audit Manager, ACM, CloudHSM, Cognito, Detective, Directory Service, Firewall Manager, Automated Forensics Orchestrator for Amazon EC2, GuardDuty, IAM, IAM Identity Center, Inspector, KMS, Macie, Network Firewall, Private CA, Secrets Manager, Security Hub, Security Lake, Shield, Shield Advanced, STS, WAF |
| Storage & data management | S3, AWS Backup, DataSync, EFS (including lifecycle policies), FSx for Lustre |
Out of scope
Only two services: Amazon MWAA (Managed Workflows for Apache Airflow) and AWS Payment Cryptography. If either appears as an option, it's almost certainly a distractor.
Technologies and concepts that may appear
AWS CLI, AWS SDKs, AWS Management Console, secure remote access, certificate management, infrastructure as code (IaC).
Job tasks out of scope
Designing cryptographic algorithms, packet-level traffic analysis, architecting overall cloud deployments, managing end-user compute (WorkSpaces etc.), training machine learning models.
The classic answer-killers
| Phrase in the question | What it usually means |
|---|---|
| "Least operational overhead" / "most efficient" | Managed, native features over custom Lambda code, scripts, EC2-based agents or third-party tools |
| "Prevent" vs "detect" | Prevent = SCP, RCP, declarative policy, permissions boundary, CloudFormation Hook, Block Public Access. Detect = Config rule, GuardDuty, Security Hub, Access Analyzer. Don't pick a detective control when they asked to prevent |
| "Across all accounts" / "including new accounts" | Organizations + delegated administrator + auto-enable, StackSets with auto-deployment, Firewall Manager, Control Tower controls |
| "Immutable" / "cannot be deleted, even by root" | S3 Object Lock compliance mode, Backup Vault Lock compliance mode, logically air-gapped vault |
| "Without changing application code" | Server-side encryption, load balancer TLS termination, WAF, Secrets Manager managed rotation, network controls; not client-side encryption or SDK changes |
| "Preserve evidence" / "forensics" | Isolate, don't terminate; snapshot and capture memory before stopping; deactivate (don't delete) keys |
| "Near real time" | EventBridge rules on findings/API events, CloudWatch metric filters and alarms, not daily reports or scheduled scans |
| "Full control of keys" / "AWS must not access keys" | CloudHSM or external key store (XKS); for "control of key material lifecycle" think imported key material |
- SCS-C03 exam guide – AWS
- Comparison of SCS-C02 and SCS-C03 – AWS
- In-scope services · Out-of-scope services · Technologies and concepts – AWS
- Security – Specialty certification page (duration, cost, languages) – AWS
- SCS-C03 announcement – AWS Training and Certification Blog
- Service availability updates, Oct 2025 · Service availability updates, Mar 2026 – AWS
- Audit Manager availability change · CloudTrail Lake availability change – AWS Docs
- Shield Advanced automatic L7 mitigation and the Anti-DDoS managed rule group – AWS Docs
Detection
1.1The detection services at a glance
Each service answers one question. Exam questions usually describe the question and expect you to name the service.
| Service | Answers | Looks at | Needs you to enable logs? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amazon GuardDuty | "Is someone attacking or misusing my account right now?" | CloudTrail management events, VPC Flow Logs, DNS query logs (foundational) + optional protection plans | No. GuardDuty reads its own independent copy of the foundational sources |
| Amazon Inspector | "What software vulnerabilities and network exposure do I have?" | EC2, ECR images, Lambda functions, code repositories | No (uses SSM Agent or agentless snapshot scanning for EC2) |
| Amazon Macie | "Where is sensitive data (PII, credentials) in S3, and is the bucket exposed?" | S3 objects and bucket settings | No |
| AWS Security Hub CSPM | "Am I following best practices and compliance standards?" | Controls backed by AWS Config rules; aggregates findings from other services | Yes: AWS Config must be recording |
| AWS Security Hub | "Which risks matter most, and how do they connect?" | Correlates findings (GuardDuty, Inspector, Macie, CSPM) into exposures and attack paths in OCSF | Depends on the services feeding it |
| Amazon Detective | "What happened, how did it start, what else did it touch?" | Behavior graph built from CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, GuardDuty findings, EKS audit logs | No; requires GuardDuty enabled |
| Amazon Security Lake | "Where do I keep and query all security data in one standard format?" | Normalizes AWS and third-party logs to OCSF in S3 | It collects the sources for you |
| AWS Config | "What changed, who changed it, and is it compliant?" | Resource configuration history and rules | Config recorder must be on |
| IAM Access Analyzer | "Who outside (or inside) my trust zone can reach this resource? What access is unused?" | Resource policies, IAM policies, last-accessed data | No |
Pick the detection service
1.1Amazon GuardDuty in depth
| Protection | What it adds |
|---|---|
| Foundational threat detection | Always on once enabled: CloudTrail management events, VPC Flow Logs, Route 53 Resolver DNS logs. Detects reconnaissance, crypto-mining DNS lookups, credential use from unusual places, calls from Tor or known-malicious IPs. |
| S3 Protection | Watches S3 data-plane events (GetObject, ListBucket…) for exfiltration patterns and suspicious policy changes |
| EKS Protection | Analyzes EKS audit logs (control plane) for suspicious Kubernetes API activity |
| Runtime Monitoring | Lightweight security agent on EKS, ECS (including Fargate) and EC2 that sees process, file and network activity inside the workload |
| Malware Protection for EC2 | Agentless scan of EBS volumes when GuardDuty sees suspicious behavior (or on demand) |
| Malware Protection for S3 | Scans newly uploaded objects in chosen buckets; can tag objects so a bucket policy blocks infected files |
| RDS Protection | Anomalous login activity on Aurora / RDS |
| Lambda Protection | Network activity from Lambda functions (for example, talking to crypto-mining pools) |
| Extended Threat Detection | On automatically. Correlates signals over time into attack sequence findings (critical severity), for example "privilege discovery on S3, then bucket policy loosened, then data read from an unusual location". More plans enabled = more sequences it can see. |
- Finding type format:
ThreatPurpose:ResourceType/ThreatFamily.Variant, for exampleCryptoCurrency:EC2/BitcoinTool.B!DNSorUnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.OutsideAWS. - Tuning: trusted IP lists (no findings for these IPs), threat lists (your known-bad IPs), suppression rules (auto-archive known benign findings; they're still generated, just archived).
- Multi-account: designate a delegated administrator (security tooling account) from the management account, then auto-enable for all existing and new member accounts. GuardDuty is Regional: enable it in every Region, including ones you don't use.
- Acting on findings: every finding is sent to EventBridge automatically → rule → SNS, Lambda, Step Functions or SSM Automation.
1.1Security Hub, Macie, and building alerts
Security Hub CSPM vs Security Hub
| Security Hub CSPM | Security Hub | |
|---|---|---|
| Job | Runs best-practice controls against standards: AWS Foundational Security Best Practices, CIS AWS Foundations, PCI DSS, NIST SP 800-53 | Correlates findings across services into prioritized exposures and attack paths; response workflows |
| Finding format | ASFF (AWS Security Finding Format) | OCSF (Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework) |
| Prerequisite | AWS Config recording the relevant resource types | Feeds from GuardDuty, Inspector, Macie, CSPM |
- Central configuration from the delegated admin: one policy enables standards and controls across accounts, OUs and Regions.
- Cross-Region aggregation: link Regions to one home Region to see everything in one place.
- Automation rules: change finding fields automatically (suppress, set severity, add notes) when criteria match.
- Custom actions send a chosen finding to EventBridge so an analyst can click "Isolate instance" and trigger a runbook.
Amazon Macie
- Automated sensitive data discovery samples objects across all buckets continuously and gives each bucket a sensitivity score (cheap, broad).
- Sensitive data discovery jobs scan chosen buckets fully, once or on a schedule (deep, targeted).
- Managed data identifiers (credit cards, passport numbers, AWS secret keys…), custom data identifiers (your regex plus keywords), allow lists (ignore known test values).
- Two finding kinds: policy findings (bucket made public, encryption removed) and sensitive data findings. Results go to EventBridge and Security Hub; full results to an S3 bucket you choose (KMS-encrypted).
Alerts and dashboards
| Need | Build it with |
|---|---|
| Alert within minutes when the root user signs in or someone calls an API without permission | CloudTrail → CloudWatch Logs → metric filter → CloudWatch alarm → SNS (the classic CIS benchmark alarms), or an EventBridge rule on the CloudTrail event |
| React to each GuardDuty / Security Hub / Macie finding | EventBridge rule (filter on severity, finding type) → SNS, Lambda, Step Functions |
| Catch unusual spikes without a fixed threshold | CloudWatch anomaly detection alarms; CloudWatch Logs anomaly detection |
| Workload health monitoring (skill 1.1.2) | Route 53 health checks, ELB target health checks, CloudWatch Synthetics canaries, alarms on 4xx/5xx spikes |
| One dashboard across accounts | CloudWatch cross-account observability (monitoring account), Amazon Managed Grafana |
| Route notifications to people centrally | AWS User Notifications (email, chat, mobile) from EventBridge events |
1.1Automated assessments and investigations
| Tool | What it automates | Example |
|---|---|---|
| AWS Config rules | Continuous or periodic evaluation of resource configuration. Managed rules, custom Lambda rules, or custom rules written in Guard (policy-as-code) | s3-bucket-public-read-prohibited, restricted-ssh, encrypted-volumes |
| Conformance packs | A bundle of Config rules + remediation deployed as one unit, to one account or the whole organization | Operational Best Practices for PCI DSS / HIPAA / NIST sample packs |
| Config aggregator | Multi-account, multi-Region view of config and compliance | Org-wide compliance dashboard in the security account |
| Security Hub CSPM | Scheduled and change-triggered control checks with a security score | Weekly score report to leadership |
| Systems Manager State Manager | Keeps instances in a defined state on a schedule (associations) | Make sure the CloudWatch agent and EDR agent are installed and running on every instance; re-apply if removed |
| Amazon Inspector | Continuous rescans when new CVEs are published or new software is installed | No scheduled scans to manage |
| Trusted Advisor | Security checks (open ports, MFA on root, exposed keys) | Org-wide view in the management account |
1.2Log sources: what each one captures
| Log | Captures | Watch out for |
|---|---|---|
| CloudTrail management events | Control-plane API calls: who, what, when, from where (CreateUser, PutBucketPolicy, RunInstances) | On by default (90-day Event history). Create a trail to keep them longer in S3 |
| CloudTrail data events | Data-plane calls: S3 GetObject/PutObject, Lambda Invoke, DynamoDB item operations… | Off by default, extra cost; use advanced event selectors to limit to sensitive buckets |
| CloudTrail Insights events | Unusual API call volume or error rates | Off by default |
| CloudTrail network activity events | API calls made through VPC endpoints, including denied calls from outside your org | Helps prove data-perimeter enforcement |
| VPC Flow Logs | IP traffic metadata: source/dest IP and port, protocol, bytes, ACCEPT/REJECT (per VPC, subnet or ENI) | No packet contents. Not captured: traffic to the Amazon DNS server, instance metadata (169.254.169.254), Amazon Time Sync, DHCP |
| Transit gateway flow logs | Traffic through a transit gateway between VPCs and on-premises | The east-west view between VPCs |
| Route 53 Resolver query logs | DNS queries made from your VPCs | Spot DNS exfiltration and calls to malicious domains |
| DNS Firewall logs | Queries blocked or allowed by Resolver DNS Firewall | Part of Resolver query logging |
| ELB access logs | Every request to an ALB/NLB/CLB: client IP, latency, path, TLS cipher | Off by default; bucket policy must allow the ELB log delivery service |
| CloudFront standard / real-time logs | Every viewer request at the edge | Real-time logs go to Kinesis Data Streams |
| AWS WAF logs | Every inspected request, matched rule, action | Destination name must start with aws-waf-logs- (CloudWatch log group, S3 bucket or Firehose stream) |
| API Gateway execution / access logs | Execution: request processing details. Access: who called what (custom format) | Needs an account-level IAM role ARN set in API Gateway settings |
| S3 server access logs | Requests to a bucket, best effort, no cost except storage | CloudTrail data events are more complete and timely for security |
| EKS control plane logs | API server, audit, authenticator, controller manager, scheduler | Off by default; audit + authenticator are the security ones |
| Network Firewall logs | Alert, flow and TLS logs | Alert logs show which stateful rule fired |
| OS / application logs | Anything on the instance | Ship with the CloudWatch agent (needs an IAM role and config file) |
Which log would show it?
1.2Organization trails and a central logging account
- Member accounts can see the org trail but can't modify or delete it.
- Bucket policy grants
cloudtrail.amazonaws.coms3:PutObject, scoped withaws:SourceArn/aws:SourceAccount(stops the confused deputy problem). - Encrypt with SSE-KMS: the KMS key policy must let CloudTrail
GenerateDataKey*and let readersDecrypt. A missing key-policy statement is the #1 cause of "trail stopped delivering". - Turn on log file integrity validation: CloudTrail writes hourly digest files signed with SHA-256 so you can prove logs weren't changed or deleted (
aws cloudtrail validate-logs). - Protect the bucket: separate account, restrictive bucket policy, versioning, S3 Object Lock, lifecycle to Glacier storage classes.
Centralizing CloudWatch Logs
- Subscription filters stream log events in near real time to Lambda, Kinesis Data Streams, Firehose or OpenSearch. For cross-account, the central account creates a destination (with a resource policy allowing source accounts), and each source account subscribes its log groups to it.
- CloudWatch agent: install with Systems Manager (Distributor or Run Command), store the agent config in Parameter Store, attach
CloudWatchAgentServerPolicyto the instance role. In private subnets add alogsinterface VPC endpoint (andmonitoringfor metrics). - Set a retention period on every log group (the default is never expire), and encrypt log groups with KMS where required.
1.2Amazon Security Lake and third-party tools
Security Lake builds a security data lake in your own account: it collects logs, converts them to OCSF in Apache Parquet, and stores them in S3 managed by Lake Formation.
- Native sources: CloudTrail management and data events, VPC Flow Logs, Route 53 Resolver query logs, Security Hub findings, EKS audit logs, AWS WAF logs.
- Custom sources: third-party or on-premises data, already converted to OCSF.
- Rollup Regions consolidate data from many Regions; set retention and storage-class transitions.
- Subscribers: data access subscribers get new objects pushed (S3 notifications / SQS) for SIEM ingestion; query access subscribers query in place with Athena through Lake Formation permissions.
- Multi-account via a delegated administrator.
1.2Analyzing, normalizing and correlating logs
| Tool | Best for |
|---|---|
| CloudWatch Logs Insights | Interactive queries on log groups (also cross-account). Example: fields @timestamp, userIdentity.arn | filter eventName="ConsoleLogin" and responseElements.ConsoleLogin="Failure" | stats count() by sourceIPAddress |
| Amazon Athena | SQL over logs in S3 (CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, ALB, WAF, Security Lake). Use partitions (or partition projection) to keep scans cheap |
| Security Hub findings | Filter, group and prioritize findings across accounts |
| OpenSearch Service | Full-text search, dashboards and SIEM-style correlation; Security Analytics detection rules |
| Lambda | Parse and normalize custom formats on the way in (Firehose transformation) |
| Amazon Managed Grafana | Dashboards correlating CloudWatch, OpenSearch, Athena and third-party data sources |
| CloudTrail Lake Maintenance | SQL over immutable event data stores, 7 years by default (longer with extended retention); no new customers since Apr 30, 2026. AWS recommends migrating to CloudWatch |
| Amazon Detective | Visual investigation; correlation is done for you |
1.3Troubleshooting missing logs and silent alerts
Almost every "logs are missing" question is a permissions problem: either the service can't write, or the key policy won't let it encrypt.
| Symptom | Likely cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Lambda function produces no CloudWatch logs | Execution role lacks logs:CreateLogGroup, logs:CreateLogStream, logs:PutLogEvents | Attach AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole (or equivalent) |
| API Gateway execution logs never appear | No CloudWatch Logs role ARN set at the API Gateway account level, or logging not enabled on the stage | Set the role in API Gateway settings; enable logging per stage |
| CloudWatch agent installed but nothing arrives | Instance profile missing permissions, agent not started, wrong config, or no route to the Logs endpoint | Attach CloudWatchAgentServerPolicy; check agent log on the instance; add a logs VPC endpoint or NAT |
| CloudTrail stopped delivering to S3 | Bucket policy changed, or the KMS key policy doesn't allow CloudTrail, or the key was disabled | Restore bucket policy and key-policy statements; check trail status (LatestDeliveryError) |
| VPC Flow Logs not published | IAM role trust policy doesn't trust vpc-flow-logs.amazonaws.com, or S3 bucket policy blocks delivery | Fix trust policy / bucket policy |
| CloudFront standard logs missing in S3 | Legacy standard logging needs ACLs enabled on the target bucket; the bucket has Object Ownership "bucket owner enforced" | Enable ACLs on the log bucket, or use the newer logging to CloudWatch Logs / Firehose |
| WAF logging won't save | Destination name doesn't start with aws-waf-logs- | Rename the log group / bucket / stream |
| ELB access logs fail | Bucket policy doesn't allow the ELB log delivery principal, or bucket uses SSE-KMS (unsupported for ALB logs; use SSE-S3) | Correct bucket policy; use SSE-S3 |
| Security Hub CSPM controls show "no data" | AWS Config isn't recording that resource type in that Region | Enable Config recording (all resource types) |
| EventBridge rule for an IAM / console event never fires | Global-service CloudTrail events (IAM, STS sign-in) are delivered in us-east-1; rule was created in another Region | Create the rule in us-east-1 (or forward events cross-Region) |
| Alarm fires but the encrypted SNS topic delivers nothing | The topic's KMS key policy doesn't let CloudWatch / EventBridge use the key (AWS managed aws/sns keys can't be edited) | Use a customer managed key with a key policy allowing the service principal |
| Route 53 health check reports endpoint unhealthy, but it's up | Security group / NACL blocks Route 53 health checker IP ranges | Allow the health checker ranges |
Why is it missing?
Think of your answer, then tap a card to check it.
Incident response
2.1The incident response lifecycle and runbooks
AWS follows the NIST SP 800-61 lifecycle. Exam questions place you in one phase and ask for the next correct action.
| Building block | Use it for |
|---|---|
| Systems Manager Automation runbooks | Codified response steps (isolate instance, snapshot volumes, disable access key, revoke public access). AWS provides managed runbooks; you write your own in YAML/JSON. Can run cross-account and cross-Region. |
| Systems Manager OpsCenter | Central place for OpsItems: collects related findings, alarms and events into one work item, shows related resources and lets responders run the linked runbook from the item. |
| SageMaker AI notebooks (Jupyter) | Interactive investigation playbooks: documented queries (Athena, CloudTrail) and analysis steps that analysts run and record as they go. |
| Step Functions | Orchestrate multi-step, branching response (triage → isolate → capture → notify → wait for approval) |
| EventBridge | Trigger the right runbook from a finding automatically |
2.1Prepare before anything happens
| Preparation | How on AWS |
|---|---|
| Provision access in advance | Incident-response IAM roles pre-deployed in every account (CloudFormation StackSets), an IR permission set in Identity Center, documented break-glass access. You don't want to be writing IAM policies mid-incident. |
| Deploy security tools ahead | GuardDuty, Security Hub, Detective, Inspector, Macie enabled org-wide; a dedicated forensics account with an isolated VPC, a forensic AMI (built with EC2 Image Builder) and an evidence bucket with Object Lock |
| Minimize the blast radius | Multi-account separation, SCPs, least privilege, network segmentation, short-lived credentials, encryption with separate keys per data domain |
| Shield Advanced protections | Protect internet-facing resources before an attack; associate Route 53 health checks (health-based detection), enable proactive engagement so the Shield Response Team (SRT) calls you, grant the SRT access with an IAM role, enable the WAF Anti-DDoS managed rule group |
| Turn logging on now | You can't investigate with logs you never collected: org trail, data events for sensitive buckets, VPC Flow Logs, Resolver query logs |
| Contacts | Set the account's alternate security contact so AWS can reach the right team (for example, about exposed credentials) |
2.1Test the plan
| Method | What it proves |
|---|---|
| Tabletop exercise | People know their roles and the playbook makes sense (discussion only) |
| Game day / simulation | The team and tooling actually work under realistic conditions |
| AWS Fault Injection Service (FIS) | Inject real faults (stop instances, throttle APIs, disrupt network, fail an AZ) with stop conditions tied to CloudWatch alarms; verify that detection and automated response kick in |
| AWS Resilience Hub | Assess an application against RTO/RPO targets, recommend improvements, and generate FIS experiments and alarms to validate recovery |
| GuardDuty sample findings | CreateSampleFindings produces fake findings so you can test the EventBridge → runbook → notification pipeline end to end |
2.1Automated remediation patterns
| Trigger | Automated response |
|---|---|
| GuardDuty: EC2 instance talking to a command-and-control server | Step Functions: tag, snapshot, swap to an isolation security group, notify; or the Automated Forensics Orchestrator for Amazon EC2 |
AWS Health event AWS_RISK_CREDENTIALS_EXPOSED (key found on a public repo) | Lambda: deactivate the access key, review CloudTrail for its use, notify the owner |
| Config rule: S3 bucket made public | Config automatic remediation with SSM Automation: re-enable Block Public Access |
| Config rule: security group opens 0.0.0.0/0 on port 22 | SSM Automation removes the rule |
| Security Hub custom action "Isolate" | Analyst-approved trigger of the same runbook |
| Regional or zonal impairment / need to move traffic away | Amazon Application Recovery Controller: zonal shift away from an AZ, or routing controls to fail over a Region |
Automated Forensics Orchestrator for Amazon EC2
An AWS Solution (Guidance) built on Step Functions. A finding (GuardDuty, Config, third party) reaches Security Hub → EventBridge, which starts the workflow: triage, then in parallel memory acquisition (stored in S3) and disk acquisition (EBS snapshot shared to the forensics account), isolation with a restrictive security group, then automated investigation on a forensic instance. Results are tracked in DynamoDB.
2.2Responding to a compromised EC2 instance
The order matters: preserve volatile evidence first, then contain, then investigate a copy, then rebuild.
- Capture metadata and tag the instance (for example
Quarantine=true); enable termination protection. - Remove it from service: detach from the Auto Scaling group (or set it to Standby) so it isn't replaced and terminated, and deregister from the load balancer.
- Isolate: replace its security groups with an isolation security group (no inbound, no outbound or only to forensic tools). Existing tracked connections may survive a security group change, so add a network ACL deny for an immediate cut.
- Capture memory while it's running (memory is lost on stop).
- Snapshot the EBS volumes and share the snapshots (with a customer managed key) to the forensics account.
- Investigate a copy in the isolated forensic environment, never the original.
- Eradicate and recover: terminate, relaunch from a known-good, patched AMI, rotate any credentials it held (including its instance role's sessions).
Put the containment steps in order
Click the steps in the order you'd do them. One option doesn't belong at all; leave it out. Then check.
2.2Containing other resource types
| Compromised | Contain | Remember |
|---|---|---|
| IAM user access key | Deactivate the key (keep it for evidence), then rotate; review CloudTrail for everything the key did | Check for new users, keys, roles or policies the attacker created (persistence) |
| IAM role (temporary credentials stolen) | Revoke active sessions on the role: IAM adds an inline deny policy with an aws:TokenIssueTime condition, so every session issued before now fails | STS credentials can't be "deleted"; the revoke-sessions deny is how you kill them. Then fix the cause (for example, enforce IMDSv2) |
| Root user | Reset password, replace MFA, delete root access keys, check billing and IAM changes | With centralized root access, member accounts may have no root credentials at all |
| S3 bucket exposed / data exfiltration | Turn on Block Public Access, add a deny bucket policy, rotate exposed credentials | Use Macie to scope what sensitive data was exposed; CloudTrail data events to see what was read |
| Lambda function | Set reserved concurrency to 0 (stops all invocations), remove triggers, restrict the execution role | Check the function's code and layers versions for tampering |
| EKS pod / node | Label and isolate the pod with a Kubernetes network policy, cordon the node, revoke the pod's IAM role, capture the node | GuardDuty EKS Protection and Runtime Monitoring findings tell you which pod |
| RDS database | Change master password (or rotate in Secrets Manager), restrict security group, snapshot for evidence | Enable deletion protection |
| Web application under attack | WAF block rules (IP set, rate-based, geo), Shield Advanced SRT | Count mode first if false positives would hurt |
2.2Forensic artifacts, searching, and validating findings 2.2.3 new
Capture and store evidence
- Copy relevant logs (CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, application and OS logs) plus snapshots and memory images to an evidence bucket in the forensics account: versioning, Object Lock, SSE-KMS with a dedicated key, tight bucket policy.
- Record SHA-256 hashes of artifacts and keep a chain of custody (who touched what, when).
- Use CloudTrail log file integrity validation to prove log authenticity.
Search and correlate
| Question | Where to look |
|---|---|
| Everything a principal did in the last 30 days across accounts | Athena on the org trail (or Security Lake); CloudWatch Logs Insights cross-account; Detective |
| Which IPs an instance talked to | VPC Flow Logs (Athena), Detective |
| Which domains it resolved | Route 53 Resolver query logs |
| Correlate app logs with API activity | OpenSearch, Security Lake + Athena, or a SIEM subscriber |
Validate findings to assess scope and impact
- True or false positive? Check finding details (actor, IPs, user agent, resource), compare with known-good behavior; archive known-benign patterns with suppression rules.
- Scope: which accounts, Regions, principals and resources are involved? Detective finding groups and GuardDuty attack sequences connect related findings.
- Impact: was data touched (Macie, S3 data events)? Is the vulnerability actually reachable (Inspector network reachability, Security Hub exposure)? What can the compromised identity reach (IAM Access Analyzer, policy review)?
2.2Root cause analysis with Amazon Detective
Detective automatically builds a behavior graph from CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, GuardDuty findings and EKS audit logs (up to a year of history), so you can pivot from a finding to the entities involved without writing queries.
- Finding groups cluster related findings and entities into one investigation.
- Investigations for IAM users and roles highlight indicators of compromise (unusual geolocation, new API calls, impossible travel).
- Integrates with GuardDuty and Security Hub ("Investigate in Detective").
- Root cause method: establish timeline → identify initial access → trace lateral movement and persistence → identify control gaps → fix and update the playbook.
2.2Eradicate and recover
- Rebuild, don't clean: redeploy from IaC and known-good AMIs/images rather than trusting a cleaned host.
- Restore data from backups made before the compromise (AWS Backup point-in-time, a logically air-gapped vault if the account itself was compromised).
- Rotate every secret and key the attacker could have seen (Secrets Manager rotation, new access keys, KMS key rotation if key material is suspected).
- Patch the entry point, tighten policies, add detections for the technique used.
- Post-incident review: update playbooks and automation, track action items.
What's the next step?
Think of your answer, then tap a card to check it.
Infrastructure security
3.1Edge security strategy: match the control to the threat
| Threat | Control |
|---|---|
| Network/transport DDoS (SYN floods, UDP reflection) | Shield Standard (free, automatic, all customers); Shield Advanced for larger attacks, SRT help, cost protection. Put CloudFront / Global Accelerator in front to absorb at the edge |
| HTTP request floods (layer 7 DDoS) | CloudFront caching + AWS WAF rate-based rules + the WAF Anti-DDoS managed rule group |
| OWASP Top 10 (SQL injection, XSS, bad inputs) | AWS WAF AWS Managed Rules: Core rule set, SQL database, Known bad inputs, plus language/OS-specific groups |
| Scrapers, scanners, bots | WAF Bot Control (Common or Targeted), CAPTCHA and Challenge actions |
| Credential stuffing on a login page | WAF Fraud Control account takeover prevention (ATP) |
| Fake account sign-ups | WAF Fraud Control account creation fraud prevention (ACFP) |
| Traffic from sanctioned countries | CloudFront geographic restrictions (whole distribution) or WAF geo match rule (finer: per path, with labels, count first) |
| Users bypassing CloudFront to hit S3 directly | Origin access control (OAC) + bucket policy allowing only that distribution (aws:SourceArn) |
| Users bypassing CloudFront to hit the ALB | CloudFront adds a secret custom header and the ALB (or WAF on the ALB) requires it; restrict ALB security group to the CloudFront managed prefix list; or use CloudFront VPC origins to keep the ALB private |
| Premium content for paying users only | CloudFront signed URLs (one file) or signed cookies (many files), with trusted key groups |
| Sensitive form fields readable by middle tiers | CloudFront field-level encryption (public key encrypts chosen fields at the edge) |
| IoT devices connecting at scale | AWS IoT Core: X.509 device certificates (mutual TLS) + IoT policies attached to certificates; policy variables such as ${iot:Connection.Thing.ThingName} limit each device to its own topics |
| Browsers on another site calling your S3 bucket | S3 CORS configuration with specific AllowedOrigins and methods. CORS relaxes the browser's same-origin rule; it isn't access control, so keep it narrow and still use bucket policies |
Pick the edge control
3.1AWS WAF in depth
- Where: a web ACL attaches to CloudFront (global; create in us-east-1), ALB, API Gateway REST APIs, AppSync, Cognito user pools, App Runner, Amplify and Verified Access. Not NLBs or EC2 directly.
- Rule actions: Allow, Block (custom response possible), Count (test without impact), CAPTCHA (human puzzle), Challenge (silent browser check). Rules run in priority order; the web ACL has a default action.
- Statements: IP sets, geo match, regex pattern sets, string/size constraints, SQLi and XSS detection, label match, and scope-down statements to narrow managed rules.
- Labels: a rule can add a label (for example from Bot Control); later rules act on that label. Lets you combine signals.
- Rate-based rules: count requests per aggregation key over a window; aggregate by IP, forwarded IP header, a header/cookie/query value, label namespace, HTTP method, or JA3/JA4 TLS fingerprint (client fingerprinting, skill 3.1.3). Combine keys for "per session per path" limits.
- Capacity: each rule costs web ACL capacity units (WCUs); a web ACL has a default allowance you can raise for extra cost.
- Third-party rules 3.1.4 new: AWS Marketplace managed rule groups from security vendors drop into a web ACL like AWS Managed Rules.
- Logging to CloudWatch Logs, S3 or Firehose (names start with
aws-waf-logs-); redact sensitive fields. WAF logs are a native Security Lake source (normalized to OCSF). - Behind a CDN or proxy: inspect the client IP from
X-Forwarded-Forusing the forwarded IP configuration, otherwise you block the proxy.
3.1AWS Shield Standard vs Shield Advanced
| Shield Standard | Shield Advanced | |
|---|---|---|
| Cost | Free, automatic | Monthly subscription per organization (1-year commitment) plus data transfer |
| Protects | All AWS customers against common L3/L4 attacks | CloudFront, Route 53 hosted zones, Global Accelerator, ALB, Classic LB, Elastic IPs (EC2, NLB) |
| Detection | Automatic | Tailored per resource; health-based detection using Route 53 health checks; L7 alerts via CloudWatch |
| Humans | No | Shield Response Team (SRT) 24/7 (with Business or Enterprise Support); proactive engagement |
| Money | — | Cost protection: credits for scaling charges caused by a DDoS attack; AWS WAF included at no extra cost for protected resources |
| Visibility | — | Attack diagnostics and history, protection groups |
| At scale | — | Deploy protections across accounts with Firewall Manager |
For Elastic IPs, Shield Advanced pushes your network ACLs to the AWS border during an attack. For layer 7 it alerts by default rather than auto-blocking, to avoid blocking real users; the WAF Anti-DDoS managed rule group (default since March 26, 2026) mitigates HTTP floods in seconds.
3.2Hardened AMIs and container images
- EC2 Image Builder pipelines build golden AMIs and container images on a schedule: base image → components (install agents, apply CIS or STIG hardening components) → test (including an Inspector vulnerability scan) → distribute to accounts and Regions (and share with the organization). Rebuild when new patches land.
- Systems Manager keeps configuration in line after launch (State Manager, Patch Manager, Run Command).
- EC2 Allowed AMIs (account setting, enforceable with a declarative policy) limits which AMI owners/sources instances can launch from.
- IMDSv2 required (session tokens) blocks SSRF-style credential theft; set the hop limit to 1 if containers on the host shouldn't reach the metadata service.
- EBS encryption by default per Region.
- Container images: minimal/distroless bases, non-root users, ECR enhanced scanning (Inspector, continuous), immutable tags, image signing (AWS Signer with Notation) verified at deploy.
3.2Roles for compute: who gets which credentials
| Workload | Mechanism | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| EC2 | Instance profile (container for one IAM role) | Credentials served by IMDS, auto-rotated |
| ECS task | Task role = what your app code can call. Task execution role = what the ECS agent needs (pull from ECR, write logs, fetch secrets for injection) | Mixing these up is a favorite question |
| Lambda | Execution role = what the function can call. Resource-based policy = who may invoke the function | S3/SNS/EventBridge triggers need the resource policy |
| EKS pod | EKS Pod Identity (associate a role with a service account) or IRSA (OIDC) | Never rely on the node role for pods |
| AWS service acting for you | Service role (you create, the service assumes) or service-linked role (predefined by the service, you can't edit its permissions) | Passing a role to a service needs iam:PassRole |
| On-premises / other cloud | IAM Roles Anywhere (X.509 certificate → temporary credentials) | See Domain 4 |
iam:PassRole and the iam:PassedToService condition.3.2Vulnerability scanning and patching
Amazon Inspector
| Target | How |
|---|---|
| EC2 | Agent-based via SSM Agent, or agentless (scans EBS snapshots); OS and language packages; network reachability findings (ports reachable from the internet); CIS benchmark assessments |
| ECR images | Enhanced scanning on push and continuously as new CVEs appear |
| Lambda | Standard scanning (package dependencies) and code scanning (code-level flaws such as injection, hardcoded secrets) |
| Code repositories | Code security: SAST, software composition analysis and IaC scanning for GitHub and GitLab, with findings in pull requests |
Inspector scores findings (Inspector score adjusts CVSS for your environment), exports SBOMs, supports suppression rules and runs org-wide via a delegated admin.
GuardDuty for runtime
Inspector finds weaknesses before exploitation; GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring watches EKS, ECS and EC2 for active exploitation (reverse shells, crypto miners, privilege escalation) and Malware Protection scans volumes and S3 uploads.
Patching with Systems Manager Patch Manager
- Patch baselines define approved patches (auto-approve after N days, by severity/classification).
- Patch policies (Quick Setup) apply scanning and installing across the whole organization and Regions; or maintenance windows running
AWS-RunPatchBaseline. - Scan-only vs install; compliance shows in Systems Manager and Security Hub.
- Continuous validation: Inspector rescans after patching and closes findings; anything still open is a gap.
- For immutable infrastructure, patch the image (Image Builder) and replace instances instead.
3.2Secure administrative access
| Option | Inbound port? | Public IP / bastion? | Pick it when… |
|---|---|---|---|
| Systems Manager Session Manager | None | No | Default answer: shell or port forwarding controlled by IAM, sessions logged to S3 / CloudWatch Logs and encrypted with KMS, no SSH keys. Private subnets need VPC endpoints for ssm, ssmmessages, ec2messages |
| EC2 Instance Connect | 22 (SSH) | Public IP or reachable network | Teams that need real SSH; pushes a one-time public key valid for 60 seconds, controlled by IAM |
| EC2 Instance Connect Endpoint | 22 from the endpoint only | No | SSH/RDP to instances in private subnets with no bastion and no public IP |
| EC2 serial console | — | — | Break-glass troubleshooting of an unbootable instance (can be disabled org-wide with a declarative policy) |
| Bastion host | 22 | Yes | Rarely the best answer now: more to patch and expose |
3.2Security in the pipeline
- Amazon Q Developer: code reviews in the IDE flag vulnerabilities, secrets and IaC misconfigurations and suggest fixes.
- Amazon CodeGuru Security Retired: named in the guide (static analysis for security flaws); support ended November 20, 2025. Its job moved to Inspector code security and Q Developer.
- Lambda code signing: a code signing configuration rejects deployments not signed by an approved AWS Signer profile.
- Fail the build on critical findings (quality gate); keep pipeline roles minimal; store secrets in Secrets Manager, not build variables.
3.2Guardrails for generative AI apps 3.2.7 new
The guide cites the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025 edition). Know each risk and the AWS control that addresses it.
| # | Risk | What it is | AWS controls |
|---|---|---|---|
| LLM01 | Prompt injection | Input (direct, or hidden in documents/web pages) overrides the developer's instructions | Bedrock Guardrails prompt attack filter; input validation (Lambda); keep untrusted content separate; least-privilege tools |
| LLM02 | Sensitive information disclosure | Model reveals PII, secrets or confidential data | Guardrails sensitive information filters (block or mask PII, custom regex); Macie on source data; per-user access filters on retrieval |
| LLM03 | Supply chain | Compromised models, datasets, plugins or libraries | Use vetted model providers (Bedrock), SageMaker model registry, Inspector/SBOM for dependencies |
| LLM04 | Data and model poisoning | Tampered training, fine-tuning or RAG data | Lock down S3 sources (bucket policies, versioning, Object Lock), validate data, track lineage |
| LLM05 | Improper output handling | Model output passed unchecked to SQL, shells or browsers | Treat output as untrusted: validate, encode, parameterize |
| LLM06 | Excessive agency | Agents with too many tools or permissions act harmfully | Least-privilege IAM for agent roles; limit tools; human approval for high-impact actions (Bedrock Agents user confirmation / return of control, Step Functions callback) |
| LLM07 | System prompt leakage | Attackers extract the system prompt (and any secrets in it) | Never put secrets in prompts (use Secrets Manager); Guardrails prompt-leakage detection |
| LLM08 | Vector and embedding weaknesses | Unauthorized access or cross-tenant leaks via the vector store | Access control and encryption on the vector store; metadata filters per user/tenant in Knowledge Bases |
| LLM09 | Misinformation | Confident but false answers (hallucinations) | Guardrails contextual grounding and Automated Reasoning checks; citations; human review |
| LLM10 | Unbounded consumption | Abuse drives runaway cost or denial of service | API Gateway throttling and usage plans, WAF rate limits, max token limits, Bedrock quotas, budgets |
Baseline controls for Bedrock, SageMaker AI and Amazon Q
- Bedrock: your prompts and outputs aren't used to train the base models; reach it privately through PrivateLink interface endpoints; KMS for custom models, agents and knowledge bases; CloudTrail logs API calls and model invocation logging (off by default) records prompts and responses; enforce an approved guardrail with the IAM condition key
bedrock:GuardrailIdentifier. - SageMaker AI: VPC-only mode, network isolation for training and models (no outbound calls), KMS for volumes and artifacts, inter-container traffic encryption for distributed training, least-privilege execution roles.
- Amazon Q Business: identity through IAM Identity Center; answers respect the source system's document permissions (ACLs).
Match each LLM risk to its best control
3.3Security groups, network ACLs and firewalls
| Security group | Network ACL | |
|---|---|---|
| Applies to | An ENI (instance, endpoint, load balancer…) | A subnet |
| State | Stateful: return traffic allowed automatically | Stateless: return traffic needs its own rule (ephemeral ports 1024–65535) |
| Rules | Allow only | Allow and deny |
| Evaluation | All rules together | Lowest rule number first; first match wins |
| Best for | Workload micro-segmentation; reference other security groups instead of IPs | Coarse subnet guardrails; blocking a specific IP; immediate cut-off in an incident |
Will the HTTPS request get through?
A client on the internet connects to a web server on TCP 443 in a public subnet. Set each control.
Beyond SGs and NACLs
| Control | What it adds |
|---|---|
| AWS Network Firewall | Managed stateful + stateless firewall for a VPC: Suricata-compatible IPS rules, domain allow/deny lists (egress filtering by FQDN/SNI), TLS inspection using certificates from ACM, alert/flow/TLS logs. Deploy in a dedicated firewall subnet with route table changes; centrally in an inspection VPC behind Transit Gateway (with appliance mode) |
| Route 53 Resolver DNS Firewall | Block or alert on DNS queries to bad domains (AWS managed domain lists for malware and botnets, plus your own); stops DNS-based exfiltration and C2 lookups |
| Gateway Load Balancer | Insert third-party firewall appliances transparently (GENEVE) |
| VPC Block Public Access | Account/Region setting that blocks internet gateway traffic to and from VPCs (with exclusions); enforce org-wide with a declarative policy |
| Firewall Manager | Deploy all of the above consistently across accounts (Domain 6) |
3.3Hybrid and multi-cloud connectivity
| Option | Encrypted? | Pick it when… |
|---|---|---|
| Site-to-Site VPN | Yes (IPsec, two tunnels) | Quick, encrypted link over the internet; backup for Direct Connect; can authenticate with certificates from Private CA instead of pre-shared keys |
| Direct Connect | Not by default | Private, consistent bandwidth. Add encryption with: |
| ↳ MACsec | Yes, layer 2 | Line-rate encryption between your router and the AWS DX router, on supported dedicated connections (10 Gbps and up) |
| ↳ IPsec VPN over Direct Connect | Yes, layer 3 | End-to-end IPsec on top of DX (for example on a transit VIF or public VIF), works on any connection size |
| Client VPN | Yes (TLS) | Remote users need network-level access; authenticate with mutual certificates, Active Directory or SAML; authorization rules per group; consider split tunnel |
| Verified Access | Yes | Zero-trust, VPN-less access to specific apps: each request checked against identity (Identity Center, OIDC) and device posture (Jamf, CrowdStrike…) with Cedar policies. HTTP(S) apps, and now TCP resources (SSH, RDP, RDS databases) through the Connectivity Client |
3.3Network segmentation
| Direction | Meaning | Controls |
|---|---|---|
| North/south | In and out of your network (internet, on-premises) | Public ALB + WAF for ingress; private subnets; NAT gateway for egress; centralized egress VPC with Network Firewall domain filtering; VPC Block Public Access |
| East/west | Between workloads, subnets and VPCs | Security groups referencing each other; Transit Gateway route tables to separate prod, dev and shared; Network Firewall in an inspection VPC; VPC Lattice auth policies for service-to-service |
- Isolated subnets: no route to an internet gateway or NAT. Reach AWS services through VPC endpoints: gateway endpoints (S3, DynamoDB, free) or interface endpoints (PrivateLink, most services).
- Endpoint policies limit what can be done through an endpoint (for example only your org's buckets), and bucket policies can require
aws:SourceVpceso data is only reachable from your network. - Three-tier pattern: public subnet (ALB) → private app subnet → isolated data subnet, each with its own security groups.
3.3Finding unnecessary network access
| Tool | Finds |
|---|---|
| Network Access Analyzer | Paths that violate your intent, defined as network access scopes: "no path from an internet gateway to the database subnets", "only the firewall subnet reaches the IGW" |
| Inspector network reachability | EC2 ports open and reachable from the internet (and which route makes them reachable) |
| Verified Access | Replaces broad VPN network access with per-app access, removing unneeded paths |
| Firewall Manager security group audit policies | Overly permissive or unused security groups across accounts, with remediation |
| AWS Config / Security Hub CSPM | Rules like restricted-ssh, unrestricted ports on security groups |
| IAM Access Analyzer | Resources reachable through policies (not network) from outside |
- SCS-C03 Domain 3 – AWS
- AWS WAF advanced rate-based rules – AWS Security Blog
- Shield Advanced automatic L7 mitigation / Anti-DDoS managed rule group – AWS Docs
- Amazon Inspector code security – AWS Docs
- Verified Access non-HTTP support – AWS Networking Blog
- OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 – OWASP GenAI Security Project
- Securing Bedrock integrations – AWS Prescriptive Guidance
Identity and access management
4.1Identity solutions for humans, apps and systems
| Who | Answer | Key points |
|---|---|---|
| Workforce users across many accounts | AWS IAM Identity Center | One sign-in portal for all accounts and apps. Identity source: its own directory, Active Directory (Managed Microsoft AD or AD Connector), or an external IdP (Okta, Entra ID) via SAML 2.0 with automatic provisioning via SCIM. Permission sets become IAM roles in each assigned account. Supports MFA and ABAC from IdP attributes |
| Customers of your web / mobile app | Amazon Cognito user pools | Sign-up/sign-in, social and SAML/OIDC federation, MFA, threat protection (adaptive authentication, compromised-credential checks), managed login pages; issues ID, access and refresh JWTs |
| App users who need AWS credentials directly | Cognito identity pools | Exchange a token (user pool, social, SAML, OIDC) for temporary IAM credentials; authenticated vs unauthenticated (guest) roles; role mapping by claims |
| Corporate directory in AWS | AWS Directory Service | Managed Microsoft AD (real AD, trusts with on-premises AD), AD Connector (proxy to on-premises AD, nothing cached in AWS), Simple AD (basic Samba) |
| Applications on AWS | IAM roles (instance profile, task role, execution role, Pod Identity) | Never long-term access keys in code |
| Servers and workloads outside AWS | IAM Roles Anywhere | X.509 certificates → temporary credentials (see 4.2) |
| CI/CD systems (GitHub Actions, GitLab) | IAM OIDC identity provider + role with a trust policy scoped to the repo/branch | No stored keys; AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity |
Multi-factor authentication
- Types: passkeys and FIDO2 security keys (phishing-resistant), virtual authenticator apps (TOTP), hardware TOTP tokens. A user or root can register several MFA devices.
- AWS now enforces MFA for root user console sign-in (rolled out starting with management and standalone accounts). For member accounts, the best practice is to centralize root access and remove root credentials entirely (Domain 6).
- Require MFA for sensitive API calls with
"Bool": {"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent": "true"}oraws:MultiFactorAuthAge. For IAM users calling the CLI, they get an MFA-backed session withsts:GetSessionToken.
4.1Temporary credentials: STS and presigned URLs
| API | Used by | Notes |
|---|---|---|
AssumeRole | Users, roles, services; cross-account access | Session 15 minutes up to the role's maximum (1–12 hours). Role chaining (a role assuming another role) is capped at 1 hour. Supports ExternalId, session tags, session policies, SourceIdentity |
AssumeRoleWithSAML | SAML federation into an account's roles | IdP sends Role and Provider ARNs in the SAML assertion |
AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity | OIDC: CI pipelines, EKS IRSA, mobile apps | Trust policy conditions on the token's aud and sub |
GetSessionToken | IAM users | Get MFA-authenticated temporary credentials |
GetFederationToken | Legacy custom identity broker | Rarely the right answer today |
- External ID: a secret the third party passes when assuming your role, preventing the confused deputy problem (someone tricking the vendor into using its access on your account).
- Session tags carry attributes (department, project) into the session for ABAC; passing them needs
sts:TagSessionin the trust policy. Source identity (sts:SetSourceIdentity) records the original human through role chains and can't be changed later. - S3 presigned URLs grant time-limited access to one object using the signer's permissions. Maximum 7 days with SigV4 and long-term keys, but a URL signed with temporary credentials expires when those credentials expire (often much sooner). If the signer loses permission, the URL stops working.
- CloudFront signed URLs/cookies are the edge equivalent for content behind CloudFront.
4.1Troubleshooting authentication
| Symptom | Likely cause |
|---|---|
AccessDenied calling sts:AssumeRole | Target role's trust policy doesn't name the caller (or the caller's account), a condition fails (sts:ExternalId, MFA, aws:PrincipalOrgID), or the caller's own identity policy / an SCP doesn't allow sts:AssumeRole |
| AssumeRole works without tags but fails with session tags | Trust policy lacks sts:TagSession |
| Identity Center user signs in but sees no account / role | No assignment for the user or group, or the permission set wasn't re-provisioned after a change |
| Identity Center users from Okta missing or stale | SCIM provisioning token expired or mapping error |
| ABAC through Identity Center not working | Attributes for access control not enabled/mapped |
| SAML login fails | Wrong ACS URL / audience, certificate mismatch, clock skew, missing Role attribute |
| Cognito sign-in errors | User not confirmed, wrong app client / callback URL, missing client secret, expired refresh token |
| AD Connector can't authenticate | Service account permissions, DNS resolution or security group ports to the domain controllers |
Start with CloudTrail: ConsoleLogin events (success/failure, MFA used), AssumeRole* events and their errorCode/errorMessage. Identity Center sign-in events are logged too.
4.2Policy types and evaluation logic
| Policy type | Attached to | Grants? |
|---|---|---|
| Identity-based (managed / inline) | User, group, role | Yes |
| Resource-based | Bucket, key, queue, topic, secret, function, role trust policy… | Yes (and can grant cross-account) |
| Permissions boundary | User or role | No, sets a maximum |
| Service control policy (SCP) | Org root, OU, account | No, limits principals in member accounts |
| Resource control policy (RCP) | Org root, OU, account | No, limits access to resources in member accounts |
| Session policy | Passed at AssumeRole / federation | No, narrows the session |
| VPC endpoint policy | Endpoint | No, limits what passes through it |
| ACLs (S3 legacy) | Bucket / object | Yes; disable with Object Ownership "bucket owner enforced" |
Will this request be allowed?
A role in account A calls s3:GetObject on a bucket. Set each policy layer, then read the verdict.
4.2Cross-account access and authorization services
Two ways to cross accounts
| Pattern | How | When |
|---|---|---|
| Role assumption | Target account role with a trust policy naming the source; source principal needs sts:AssumeRole | Works for every service; the caller gives up its own permissions while in the role |
| Resource-based policy | Bucket/key/queue/topic/secret/function policy names the other account or principal; the caller's identity policy must also allow it | Caller keeps its own identity (useful for copying data between accounts) |
- Scope trust and resource policies with
aws:PrincipalOrgIDoraws:PrincipalOrgPathsinstead of listing accounts. - When an AWS service is the principal (for example
cloudtrail.amazonaws.com), addaws:SourceArn/aws:SourceAccountto prevent the cross-service confused deputy. - KMS cross-account needs the key policy to allow the other account and an IAM policy in that account allowing its principals.
- IAM paths (for example
/security/,/app-team-a/) organize roles and users so policies can target groups:arn:aws:iam::*:role/security/*.
Authorization services
| Service | What it authorizes |
|---|---|
| Amazon Verified Permissions | Fine-grained permissions inside your application ("can Alice approve invoice 42?"), written in the Cedar policy language in a central policy store; supports RBAC and ABAC; can use Cognito tokens as identity and back an API Gateway Lambda authorizer |
| IAM Roles Anywhere | Workloads outside AWS: register your CA (AWS Private CA or your own) as a trust anchor, create a profile (which roles, session policies), roles trust rolesanywhere.amazonaws.com; the credential helper signs with the workload's certificate. Revoke with a CRL. Conditions can match certificate attributes |
| IAM role trust policies | Who can become the role, under which conditions |
| Resource policies | Who can use a specific resource, including from other accounts |
4.2ABAC and RBAC
| RBAC (role-based) | ABAC (attribute-based) | |
|---|---|---|
| Access decided by | Which role/group you're in | Matching tags/attributes on the principal and the resource |
| Scales by | Creating more roles and policies | Tagging; the policy stays the same |
| Good for | Stable job functions; auditors like it | Many projects/teams that change often |
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["ec2:StartInstances", "ec2:StopInstances"],
"Resource": "*",
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": { "aws:ResourceTag/project": "${aws:PrincipalTag/project}" }
}
}
aws:PrincipalTag/key: tag on the caller (from the role, or session tags from the IdP / Identity Center attributes).aws:ResourceTag/key: tag on the existing resource.aws:RequestTag/keyandaws:TagKeys: tags in the create/tag request (force new resources to carry the right tags).- Protect the tags: deny
TagResource/UntagResourceon the controlling tag keys, or users can re-tag their way into access.
4.2Least privilege in practice
| Tool | Use |
|---|---|
| Permissions boundary | Safe delegation: developers may create roles only if they attach the approved boundary. Enforce with a condition on iam:CreateRole / iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary: "iam:PermissionsBoundary": "arn:…:policy/DevBoundary", and deny removing it |
| Session policy | Narrow a single session (for example a broker giving a user access to one prefix) |
| IAM Access Analyzer policy generation | Builds a least-privilege policy from the actions a role actually used in CloudTrail |
| Last accessed information | Service- and action-level "last used" data to remove unused permissions |
| Condition keys | aws:SourceIp, aws:SourceVpc, aws:SourceVpce, aws:RequestedRegion, aws:SecureTransport, aws:CalledVia, aws:ViaAWSService, aws:PrincipalOrgID, aws:ResourceOrgID |
aws:SourceIp doesn't contain your client's IP when the request comes through a VPC endpoint or from an AWS service calling on your behalf, so an IP-restricting deny can break those. Combine with aws:ViaAWSService or use aws:SourceVpce for private traffic. Also watch NotAction + Allow, which grants everything except the listed actions.4.2Analyzing authorization failures and unintended access
| Tool | Answers |
|---|---|
| AccessDenied error messages | Most services now say which policy type denied the call ("…with an explicit deny in a service control policy", "…because no identity-based policy allows…") |
| CloudTrail | errorCode: AccessDenied with the principal, action and resource |
sts:DecodeAuthorizationMessage | Decodes the encoded failure message some services (such as EC2) return |
| IAM Policy Simulator | Test identity-based policies (and boundaries, and the SCPs that apply) against actions/resources/conditions without making real calls |
| IAM Access Analyzer: external access | Resources (S3, KMS, IAM roles, Lambda, SQS, Secrets Manager, snapshots…) shared outside your zone of trust (account or organization). Free |
| IAM Access Analyzer: internal access | Which principals inside your org can reach chosen critical resources (uses automated reasoning over all policy types) |
| IAM Access Analyzer: unused access | Unused roles, access keys, passwords and permissions (paid per role/user) |
| Access Analyzer policy validation and custom policy checks | Lint policies; in pipelines, CheckNoNewAccess, CheckAccessNotGranted, CheckNoPublicAccess block risky policy changes before deploy |
Why was it denied (or allowed)?
Think of your answer, then tap a card to check it.
Correcting unintended permissions
- Find: Access Analyzer findings, last-accessed data, Security Hub IAM controls.
- Contain: revoke sessions, deactivate keys, add a deny if urgent.
- Fix: remove or narrow the grant (resource policy, trust policy, identity policy); add an SCP/RCP guardrail so it can't recur.
- Verify: re-run the analyzer (findings move to resolved), archive intended access with archive rules.
Data protection
5.1Requiring encryption in transit
| Where | How to require TLS |
|---|---|
| Application Load Balancer | HTTPS listener with an ACM certificate and a security policy that sets TLS versions and ciphers (for example a TLS 1.3/1.2 policy, FIPS policies, post-quantum hybrid policies); HTTP listener that only redirects to HTTPS; optional mutual TLS with a trust store |
| Network Load Balancer | TLS listener (terminate) or TCP pass-through to targets that terminate TLS |
| End-to-end | Re-encrypt from the load balancer to targets (HTTPS target group); targets can use self-signed or Private CA certificates |
| CloudFront | Viewer protocol policy (redirect HTTP to HTTPS or HTTPS only), minimum TLS security policy for viewers, origin protocol policy HTTPS only |
| API Gateway | HTTPS only; choose a minimum TLS version on custom domains; mutual TLS on custom domains |
| S3 | Bucket policy denying requests where aws:SecureTransport is false; s3:TlsVersion to require a minimum version |
| RDS / Aurora | Force SSL with a parameter group (rds.force_ssl for PostgreSQL/SQL Server, require_secure_transport for MySQL/MariaDB) and the RDS CA bundle on clients |
| ElastiCache, OpenSearch, Redshift, MSK | Enable in-transit encryption (and node-to-node encryption for OpenSearch) |
{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Principal": "*",
"Action": "s3:*",
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::example-bucket", "arn:aws:s3:::example-bucket/*"],
"Condition": { "Bool": { "aws:SecureTransport": "false" } }
}
5.1Secure and private access to resources
| Option | What it does | Pick it when… |
|---|---|---|
| Gateway VPC endpoint | Route-table entry to S3 or DynamoDB; free | Private access to S3/DynamoDB from a VPC (not from on-premises) |
| Interface VPC endpoint (PrivateLink) | ENI with private IPs for an AWS service; reachable from on-premises over VPN/DX | Most AWS APIs privately (KMS, Secrets Manager, SSM, STS, Bedrock…); also S3 from on-premises |
| PrivateLink endpoint service | Expose your service behind an NLB to other VPCs/accounts | One-way private access to an internal or SaaS service; overlapping CIDRs |
| Endpoint policies | Limit which principals, actions and resources go through the endpoint | Stop data exfiltration to buckets outside your org |
| Client VPN | Managed OpenVPN-based remote access | Users need network-level access |
| Verified Access | Zero-trust per-app access | Users need specific apps, no VPN, device checks |
aws:SourceVpce equals your endpoint (careful: this also blocks the console and admin access from outside). "Instances may only write to our org's buckets" → endpoint policy with aws:ResourceOrgID.5.1Inter-resource encryption in transit 5.1.3 new
| Service | How traffic between nodes/containers is encrypted |
|---|---|
| Nitro System | Supported Nitro instance types automatically encrypt traffic between each other (AEAD, 256-bit) with no performance impact, when they're in the same Region and the same VPC or peered VPCs. Not encrypted when the traffic passes through an intermediate hop such as a transit gateway or load balancer |
| Amazon EMR | A security configuration enables in-transit encryption (TLS certificates from a PEM zip in S3 or a custom certificate provider) for node-to-node and application traffic (Spark, Hadoop, Presto), plus at-rest encryption for local disks and EMRFS on S3 |
| Amazon EKS | Pod-to-pod: Nitro encryption between supported nodes, or a service mesh with mTLS (for example Istio), or VPC Lattice; control plane traffic is TLS. Kubernetes API data at rest gets default envelope encryption with KMS (AWS-owned key by default, or your own key) |
| SageMaker AI | Inter-container traffic encryption for distributed training jobs (an option on the job; slower training), network isolation, KMS for volumes and output |
| OpenSearch Service | Node-to-node encryption option |
5.2Choosing how to encrypt data at rest
KMS key types
| Key | Control | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| AWS owned | AWS, shared | Default for some services; free; you can't see, audit or manage it |
AWS managed (aws/s3, aws/ebs…) | AWS, in your account | Rotated every year automatically; you can't edit the key policy, rotate on demand, or use it cross-account |
| Customer managed | You | Your key policy and grants, cross-account use, enable/disable, scheduled deletion (7–30 days), automatic rotation (90–2,560 days, default 365) and on-demand rotation |
- Key policy is the root of access: unless the key policy allows the account (the default "enable IAM policies" statement), IAM policies alone can't grant use of the key. Grants give temporary, programmatic permissions (used by services like EBS).
- Envelope encryption: KMS generates a data key; the plaintext data key encrypts the data and is discarded; the encrypted data key is stored with the data.
- Encryption context: non-secret key-value pairs bound to the ciphertext (additional authenticated data); logged in CloudTrail and usable in key policy conditions (
kms:EncryptionContext:…). - Useful conditions:
kms:ViaService(only when called through, say, S3),kms:CallerAccount,kms:GrantIsForAWSResource. - Key specs: symmetric AES-256 (default), asymmetric RSA/ECC (encrypt or sign/verify), HMAC, and ML-DSA post-quantum signing keys.
KMS vs CloudHSM vs custom key stores
| Option | Who holds the key material | Pick it when… |
|---|---|---|
| AWS KMS (standard) | KMS HSMs (FIPS 140-3 validated), multi-tenant service | Default: integrated with 100+ services, cheapest, least effort |
| CloudHSM key store | Your CloudHSM cluster | KMS integration, but keys must live in single-tenant HSMs you control |
| External key store (XKS) | Your HSM outside AWS, via an XKS proxy | Regulation says keys must never be in AWS; you accept latency and availability risk |
| AWS CloudHSM directly | Your single-tenant HSMs (FIPS 140-3 Level 3) in your VPC; you manage users (crypto officers, crypto users) | Apps need standard HSM APIs (PKCS#11, JCE, Microsoft CNG), SSL/TLS offload, Oracle/SQL Server TDE, or sole key custody. Run 2+ HSMs across AZs |
Server-side vs client-side
| Option | Notes |
|---|---|
| SSE-S3 | Default for all new S3 objects; AWS manages keys |
| SSE-KMS | Audit key use in CloudTrail, separate permissions to decrypt, customer managed keys; enable S3 Bucket Keys to cut KMS request costs sharply |
| DSSE-KMS | Two independent layers of encryption for compliance needs |
| SSE-C | You supply the key with every request (HTTPS required); AWS never stores it |
| Client-side | Encrypt before sending (AWS Encryption SDK, S3 Encryption Client, AWS Database Encryption SDK); AWS only ever sees ciphertext; needs code changes |
Pick the encryption key option
5.2Protecting data integrity
| Control | What it guarantees |
|---|---|
| S3 Object Lock | WORM: object versions can't be deleted or overwritten for a retention period. Requires versioning. Can set a bucket default retention |
| ↳ Governance mode | Users with s3:BypassGovernanceRetention can shorten or remove retention. For "protect against accidents, admins can override" |
| ↳ Compliance mode | No one, including the root user, can delete or shorten retention until it expires. For regulatory WORM (SEC 17a-4 style) |
| ↳ Legal hold | No expiry date; stays until removed (needs s3:PutObjectLegalHold). For litigation |
| S3 Glacier Vault Lock Maintenance | Locks a vault policy (for the original Glacier vault service) after a 24-hour test window; immutable after completion. New customers use Object Lock instead |
| Versioning + MFA Delete | Recover overwritten/deleted objects; MFA Delete (root user, CLI only) required to permanently delete versions or change versioning |
| Checksums | S3 verifies uploads with checksums (CRC32, CRC32C, CRC64NVME, SHA-1, SHA-256) |
| CloudTrail log file validation | Signed digest files prove logs weren't changed |
| Digital code signing | AWS Signer for Lambda code signing and container images; KMS asymmetric keys for sign/verify of anything; HMAC keys for message authentication |
| File validation in transfer | DataSync verifies data integrity after transfer |
Which Object Lock setting?
5.2Lifecycle management and retention
| Data | Tool | Typical rule |
|---|---|---|
| S3 objects | S3 Lifecycle | Transition to Standard-IA / Glacier storage classes, expire current or noncurrent versions, abort incomplete multipart uploads. Lifecycle can't delete versions under Object Lock retention |
| EFS files | EFS lifecycle policies | Move files not accessed for N days to Infrequent Access or Archive; move back to Standard on access |
| FSx for Lustre | Backup policies | Automatic daily backups for persistent file systems with a retention period you set; user-initiated backups kept until deleted; or use AWS Backup |
| EBS snapshots, AMIs | Data Lifecycle Manager (DLM) | Scheduled snapshots by tag, retention count/age, cross-Region and cross-account copy |
| Everything AWS Backup supports | Backup plans | Frequency, retention, lifecycle to cold storage, copy to other Regions/accounts |
| Logs | CloudWatch Logs retention, S3 lifecycle on log buckets | Keep what compliance needs, delete the rest |
5.2Secure backups, replication and ransomware protection
- AWS Backup: central backup plans across services and accounts; backup policies in Organizations apply them org-wide; cross-account and cross-Region copies; restore testing proves backups work; Backup Audit Manager reports on compliance with your backup controls.
- Backup Vault Lock: governance mode (privileged users can change it) or compliance mode (after a grace time of at least 72 hours, nobody can change or delete it, and recovery points can't be deleted before retention ends).
- Logically air-gapped vault: a secondary vault with compliance-mode lock built in, encrypted by default with an AWS owned key (or your key), shareable through RAM (or multi-party approval) so another account can restore directly even if the source account is lost.
- Data Lifecycle Manager for EBS snapshots/AMIs, including cross-account copy to a vault account.
- DataSync: encrypts in transit with TLS, verifies integrity, uses IAM roles, and can run through VPC endpoints.
- S3 Replication to a bucket in a separate, locked-down account (replica owner override), with KMS keys in the destination and Object Lock replicated.
5.3Managing and rotating secrets
| Secrets Manager | Parameter Store SecureString | |
|---|---|---|
| Rotation | Built in: managed rotation for RDS/Aurora/Redshift/DocumentDB (and RDS-managed master passwords), or a rotation Lambda; schedules as often as every 4 hours | None built in (write your own) |
| Cross-Region | Replicate secrets to other Regions | No |
| Cross-account | Resource-based policy + customer managed KMS key | Limited (advanced parameters can be shared through RAM) |
| Cost | Per secret per month + API calls | Standard parameters free |
| Pick it for | Database credentials, API keys that must rotate | Config values and simple secrets with no rotation need |
- Rotation strategies: single user (change the password in place; brief failures possible) vs alternating users (two users, swap between them; no downtime).
- Rotation Lambdas in a VPC need a route to the Secrets Manager endpoint and to the database.
- Reference secrets without exposing them: CloudFormation dynamic references, ECS/EKS secret injection, Lambda extension / caching client.
- Resource policies: block public sharing (
BlockPublicPolicy); restrict to a VPC endpoint withaws:SourceVpce.
5.3Imported key material and external key stores
AWS-generated vs imported key material 5.3.3 new
AWS-generated (origin AWS_KMS) | Imported (origin EXTERNAL) | |
|---|---|---|
| Who generates it | KMS, inside its HSMs | You, in your own key infrastructure; wrapped with a KMS-provided public key and imported |
| Durability | AWS keeps it durable | You must keep a copy; if it's deleted or expires in AWS, you must re-import the same material |
| Expiration | Never | Optional expiration date; KMS deletes it then |
| Instant removal | Only scheduled deletion of the whole key (7–30 days) | DeleteImportedKeyMaterial makes the key unusable immediately (you can re-import later) |
| Rotation | Automatic (90–2,560 days) or on demand | On demand only: import new material (state PENDING_ROTATION), then call RotateKeyOnDemand. Old material stays for decrypting |
| Key types | All | Symmetric, asymmetric and HMAC keys |
| Multi-Region | Replicas share material automatically | Import the same material into the primary and each replica; then rotate on the primary |
- On-demand rotation is limited to 25 times per key and works for symmetric encryption keys (not asymmetric, HMAC or keys in custom key stores).
- External key store (XKS): KMS keys whose material stays in your HSM outside AWS; every encrypt/decrypt goes through your XKS proxy. "Hold your own key": you can cut AWS off instantly, but your outage becomes their outage.
- CloudHSM key store: material generated and kept in your CloudHSM cluster; KMS keys in custom key stores don't support automatic rotation.
5.3Masking sensitive data 5.3.4 new
| Feature | How it works |
|---|---|
| CloudWatch Logs data protection policies | Attach to a log group or the whole account. Managed data identifiers (credit cards, emails, AWS keys, names…) and custom identifiers detect sensitive data as it's ingested and mask it in queries, Insights, subscriptions and exports. Only principals with logs:Unmask see the original. Audit findings can go to S3, CloudWatch Logs or Firehose |
| SNS message data protection Maintenance | Data protection policy on a topic to audit, de-identify (mask or redact) or deny messages containing PII/PHI, inbound (publish) or outbound (per subscription). No new customers since April 30, 2026 |
| Bedrock Guardrails sensitive information filters | Mask or block PII in prompts and model responses |
| Macie | Discovers (doesn't mask) sensitive data at rest in S3 |
logs:Unmask granted only to the security team.5.3Keys and certificates across Regions 5.3.5 new
KMS multi-Region keys
- A primary key and replicas in other Regions share the same key ID and key material, so data encrypted in one Region decrypts in another without a cross-Region call.
- Each replica is its own resource with its own key policy, grants, aliases and tags; rotation is controlled on the primary and synced.
- Use for DR, active-active apps, DynamoDB global tables with client-side encryption, and signatures verified in many Regions. Don't use them by default: single-Region keys keep data more isolated.
Certificates
| Service | Use | Regional notes |
|---|---|---|
| ACM public certificates | Free TLS certificates for ALB, NLB, CloudFront, API Gateway, with automatic renewal (DNS validation renews hands-free) | Certificates are Regional; request in each Region you use. CloudFront requires the certificate in us-east-1. Exportable public certificates are available (paid) for use outside integrated services |
| AWS Private CA | Your own private CA hierarchy (root → subordinates) for internal TLS, mTLS, IoT devices, Roles Anywhere trust anchors, VPN authentication | A CA lives in one Region; create CAs (for example a subordinate per Region) where you need them; share CAs across accounts with RAM; short-lived certificate mode (validity up to 7 days) is cheaper and avoids revocation; CRL and OCSP for revocation |
| ACM private certificates | Certificates issued from Private CA but managed (and renewed) by ACM | Use on integrated services |
Rotation and deletion cheat sheet
| Key | Rotation |
|---|---|
| AWS managed | Automatic every year; can't change |
| Customer managed symmetric (AWS material) | Optional automatic, 90–2,560 days; on demand up to 25 times; key ID and ARN unchanged, old material kept to decrypt |
| Imported material | On demand after importing new material |
| Asymmetric, HMAC, custom key store keys | No automatic rotation; create a new key and move the alias |
| Deletion | Schedule with a 7–30 day waiting period; alarm on any attempted use of a key pending deletion; prefer disabling if unsure |
Security foundations and governance
6.1AWS Organizations and the account structure
- Accounts are the strongest isolation boundary. Group them into organizational units (OUs) and attach policies at the root, OU or account.
- Enable all features (not just consolidated billing) to use policies and integrations.
- The management account pays the bill and owns the org; keep workloads out of it, because SCPs and RCPs don't apply to it.
- Trusted access lets a service work across the org; delegated administrator moves day-to-day admin of that service out of the management account.
AWS Security Reference Architecture (SRA) accounts
| Account | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Management | Org, billing, minimal access |
| Security Tooling | Delegated admin for GuardDuty, Security Hub, Inspector, Macie, Detective, Access Analyzer, Firewall Manager, root access management |
| Log Archive | Org trail, Config history, VPC Flow Logs; locked down, immutable |
| Network | Transit Gateway, inspection VPC, centralized egress, DNS |
| Shared services | Directory, CI/CD tooling |
| Workloads (prod / non-prod) | Applications |
| Forensics | Isolated investigation environment |
Common OUs: Security, Infrastructure, Workloads (Prod/Non-prod), Sandbox, Policy Staging, Suspended.
6.1AWS Control Tower
- Sets up a landing zone: management, Log Archive and Audit accounts, Identity Center, organization-wide CloudTrail and Config.
- Controls (formerly guardrails) come in three behaviors: preventive (SCPs/RCPs: stop it), detective (Config rules: report it), proactive (CloudFormation Hooks: block noncompliant resources before they're created). And three guidance levels: mandatory, strongly recommended, elective.
- Optional and custom controls: enable more from the Control Catalog; add your own with Customizations for Control Tower (CfCT: your SCPs and CloudFormation) or Account Factory for Terraform (AFT).
- Account Factory vends new accounts that are compliant from the first minute.
- Existing environments: register existing OUs and enroll existing accounts to bring them under governance; drift detection flags manual changes to the landing zone.
- Built-in Region deny control restricts which Regions can be used.
6.1Organization policies
| Policy | Controls | Typical use |
|---|---|---|
| Service control policy (SCP) | Maximum permissions of IAM users and roles (including member-account root) in member accounts | Deny leaving the org; deny disabling CloudTrail, GuardDuty, Config; deny unapproved Regions; deny root user actions; require tags |
| Resource control policy (RCP) | Maximum permissions on resources in member accounts, whoever calls (supported services include S3, STS, KMS, SQS and Secrets Manager, with more added over time) | Data perimeter: no access from outside the org; require TLS; enforce encryption standards on resources |
| Declarative policy | Enforces a service configuration (desired state) directly in the service, not an API permission. Today: EC2-related settings | Require IMDSv2 defaults, block public AMI and EBS snapshot sharing, VPC Block Public Access, disable serial console, Allowed AMIs; custom error message; account status report |
| AI services opt-out policy | Whether AWS AI services may store and use your content to improve the service | Opt every account out in one policy |
| Tag policy | Standard tag keys and allowed values | Consistent tagging (6.2.2) |
| Backup policy | AWS Backup plans applied org-wide | Every prod account backs up the same way |
{
"Sid": "DenyOutsideApprovedRegions",
"Effect": "Deny",
"NotAction": ["iam:*", "organizations:*", "sts:*", "cloudfront:*", "route53:*", "support:*"],
"Resource": "*",
"Condition": { "StringNotEquals": { "aws:RequestedRegion": ["eu-west-1", "eu-central-1"] } }
}
SCPs are inherited down the tree, and an action must be allowed at every level (root, each OU, account). The default FullAWSAccess SCP makes "deny list" strategies easy; removing it means building an allow list.
Which control fits?
6.1Delegated administrators and central security services
From the management account, register the Security Tooling account as delegated administrator for each service, then turn on auto-enable so every new account is covered.
| Service | Central capability |
|---|---|
| GuardDuty, Inspector, Macie, Detective | Delegated admin, auto-enable members, central findings |
| Security Hub | Delegated admin, central configuration policies, cross-Region aggregation |
| AWS Config | Delegated admin for org conformance packs, Config rules and aggregators |
| IAM Access Analyzer | Organization-wide analyzers |
| Firewall Manager | Firewall Manager administrator account |
| Security Lake | Delegated admin collects from all accounts |
| CloudTrail | Delegated admin can manage the org trail |
| IAM (root access management) | Delegated admin for centralized root access |
| AWS Backup, IAM Identity Center | Delegated administration |
6.1Root user credentials and break-glass access
Centralized root access for member accounts
- Root credentials management: from the management or delegated admin account, remove member accounts' root passwords, access keys, signing certificates and MFA, prevent root password recovery, and create new accounts without root credentials.
- Root sessions: when a task truly needs root (for example unlocking an S3 bucket or SQS queue policy that denies everyone), take a short-lived, task-scoped root session from the central account instead.
- AWS SRA: centralize, remove member root credentials, delegate to the Security Tooling account.
Root user for the management account (and any account keeping root)
- Strong password, MFA (FIDO2 / passkey preferred; register more than one), no access keys.
- Alert on every root sign-in (EventBridge rule on
ConsoleLoginwithuserIdentity.type = Root). - In member accounts, an SCP can deny actions by the root user.
Break-glass procedure
- Emergency access that still works if the IdP or Identity Center fails: a small number of tightly controlled IAM users or roles with hardware MFA, credentials sealed and split among custodians.
- Alarm on any use, review afterwards, rotate after use, test regularly.
6.2Infrastructure as code, securely and consistently
| Tool | Role |
|---|---|
| CloudFormation StackSets | Deploy one template to many accounts and Regions. With service-managed permissions (Organizations), target OUs and auto-deploy to accounts added later; can run from a delegated admin |
| CloudFormation Guard (cfn-guard) | Policy-as-code: write rules ("every bucket must have encryption and block public access") and validate templates (or any JSON/YAML) in the pipeline |
| cfn-lint | Checks templates against the CloudFormation spec and best practices (syntax, invalid values) |
| CloudFormation Hooks | Server-side checks that block noncompliant resources at deploy time (proactive controls) |
| Stack policies, termination protection, drift detection | Protect critical resources from updates/deletes; find manual changes |
| CloudFormation service role | Stack runs with a specific role so users don't need broad permissions themselves |
| Third-party IaC (Terraform, CDK) | Same principles: scanning in CI, least-privilege deploy roles (OIDC from the CI system), state files encrypted and access-controlled |
6.2Tags, Firewall Manager and resource sharing
Tags for management (6.2.2)
- Standard keys: department, cost center, environment, owner, data classification, application.
- Enforce with tag policies (standardize values), SCPs requiring tags on create (
aws:RequestTag,aws:TagKeys), Configrequired-tagsrule. - Use tags for ABAC, Resource Groups, patch targeting, backup selection, cost allocation and Firewall Manager scope.
AWS Firewall Manager (6.2.3)
Centrally deploy and enforce firewall rules across accounts. Prerequisites: Organizations, a Firewall Manager administrator account, and AWS Config enabled in the accounts and Regions.
| Policy type | Enforces |
|---|---|
| AWS WAF | Web ACLs / rule groups on every ALB, API Gateway or CloudFront in scope |
| Shield Advanced | Protections on in-scope resources |
| Security group | Common baseline SGs, audit rules (flag/fix overly permissive SGs), usage audit (unused/redundant SGs) |
| Network Firewall | Firewalls and policies in every VPC |
| Route 53 Resolver DNS Firewall | Rule groups on every VPC |
| Network ACL | Baseline NACL rules |
| Third-party firewalls | Palo Alto Networks Cloud NGFW, Fortinet FortiGate CNF |
Scope by OU, account or tags; new matching resources and accounts get the policy automatically, with optional auto-remediation.
Sharing resources securely (6.2.4)
| Service | Shares |
|---|---|
| AWS RAM | The resource itself, no copies: VPC subnets, Transit Gateways, Resolver rules, Private CAs, prefix lists, Network Firewall policies, Backup logically air-gapped vaults and more. Enable sharing with the organization so no invitations are needed |
| AWS Service Catalog | Portfolios of pre-approved products (CloudFormation templates) shared with accounts/OUs. Launch constraints let users deploy with a specified role, so they don't need the underlying permissions; template constraints limit parameters |
6.3Evaluating compliance and remediating
- Config rules run on change or periodically; managed, custom Lambda or Guard-based; proactive mode evaluates a resource configuration before deployment.
- Remediation: manual or automatic, using SSM Automation documents (with retries).
- Conformance packs deploy rule sets org-wide; aggregators show compliance across accounts and Regions.
- Security Hub CSPM standards give a score per standard and feed findings into automation.
- Config rule compliance changes are EventBridge events: route them to SNS, tickets or chat.
6.3Collecting audit evidence
| Need | Answer |
|---|---|
| AWS's own compliance reports (SOC 1/2/3, ISO, PCI DSS attestation) and agreements (HIPAA BAA) | AWS Artifact (self-service, in the console; also third-party ISV reports) |
| Continuously collect evidence from your accounts mapped to a framework | AWS Audit Manager Maintenance: frameworks, assessments, evidence from CloudTrail, Config and Security Hub, assessment reports. Closed to new customers April 30, 2026; AWS points to Config conformance packs |
| Show current resource compliance | Config conformance pack dashboards, Config resource compliance dashboard, Security Hub CSPM standards |
| Prove who did what | CloudTrail with log file integrity validation, retained in the Log Archive account |
| Prove backups meet policy | AWS Backup Audit Manager (a feature of AWS Backup, not Audit Manager) |
6.3Shared responsibility and the Well-Architected security pillar
Shared responsibility model
| AWS: security of the cloud | You: security in the cloud |
|---|---|
| Physical data centers, hardware, network, hypervisor, managed-service infrastructure | Data, IAM, encryption choices, OS patching on EC2, security groups, application code, configuration of services |
The split moves with the service: on EC2 you patch the OS; on Lambda, RDS or Fargate AWS does. You always own your data, identities and configuration.
Security pillar design principles
- Implement a strong identity foundation
- Maintain traceability
- Apply security at all layers
- Automate security best practices
- Protect data in transit and at rest
- Keep people away from data
- Prepare for security events
AWS Well-Architected Tool: review workloads against the framework and lenses (including custom lenses for your own standards), record risks, track improvement plans and milestones.
Service families
Finding problems
| Service | Finds | Clue in the question |
|---|---|---|
| GuardDuty | Active threats and misuse | "crypto-mining", "known malicious IP", "unusual API calls", "credential exfiltration" |
| Inspector | Software vulnerabilities, network exposure, code flaws | "CVE", "unpatched", "container image vulnerabilities", "SBOM" |
| Macie | Sensitive data in S3 | "PII", "credit card numbers in buckets", "data classification" |
| Security Hub / CSPM | Posture against standards; correlated exposures | "CIS benchmark", "PCI DSS controls", "single pane of glass", "security score" |
| Detective | Root cause and scope | "investigate", "root cause", "visualize", "related findings" |
| Config | Configuration changes and compliance | "configuration history", "who changed", "noncompliant resources" |
| Access Analyzer | External, internal and unused access | "shared outside the organization", "unused permissions", "least privilege policy" |
| Network Access Analyzer | Unintended network paths | "no path from the internet to the database", "verify segmentation" |
Logs and where they live
| Service | Records | Clue |
|---|---|---|
| CloudTrail | API calls (who did what) | "audit API activity", "who deleted", "organization trail" |
| VPC Flow Logs | IP traffic metadata | "rejected connections", "which IPs talked to the instance" |
| Resolver query logs | DNS queries from VPCs | "domain lookups", "DNS exfiltration" |
| CloudWatch Logs | App/OS/service logs, metric filters, alarms | "alert when", "metric filter", "Logs Insights" |
| Security Lake | Normalized (OCSF) security data lake | "OCSF", "SIEM subscriber", "normalize across sources" |
| CloudTrail Lake | SQL over event data stores (maintenance) | "SQL queries on CloudTrail events", "7-year immutable store" |
| Athena | SQL over logs in S3 | "ad hoc SQL over logs", "serverless query" |
| OpenSearch | Search, dashboards, SIEM-like correlation | "full-text search", "dashboards", "correlate" |
Network and edge filters
| Control | Layer / scope | Clue |
|---|---|---|
| Security group | L3/L4, per ENI, stateful, allow only | "only the app tier may reach the DB", "reference another SG" |
| Network ACL | L3/L4, per subnet, stateless, allow + deny | "block a specific IP", "subnet-level deny", "ephemeral ports" |
| Network Firewall | L3–L7 for VPC traffic, IPS, domain filtering, TLS inspection | "egress filtering by domain", "Suricata", "inspect traffic between VPCs" |
| DNS Firewall | DNS queries | "block malicious domains at DNS", "DNS exfiltration" |
| WAF | L7 HTTP(S) on CloudFront, ALB, API Gateway… | "SQL injection", "XSS", "rate limit", "bots", "geo block" |
| Shield Advanced | DDoS L3/L4 (+ L7 with WAF) | "DDoS response team", "cost protection" |
| Firewall Manager | Central policy for all of the above | "across all accounts", "new resources automatically" |
Remote and hybrid access
| Option | Job | Clue |
|---|---|---|
| Session Manager | Shell/port-forward with no inbound ports | "no SSH keys", "no bastion", "log every command" |
| EC2 Instance Connect (+ Endpoint) | IAM-controlled SSH; Endpoint reaches private subnets | "must use SSH", "private instance without bastion" |
| Client VPN | Remote users onto the network | "remote employees need network access", "mutual certificate" |
| Verified Access | Zero-trust per-app access, no VPN | "device posture", "replace VPN", "per-request policy" |
| Site-to-Site VPN | Encrypted site link over the internet | "quickly", "IPsec", "backup for DX" |
| Direct Connect + MACsec | Private link; L2 encryption on dedicated connections | "consistent bandwidth", "encrypt at line rate" |
Keys, secrets and certificates
| Service | Job | Clue |
|---|---|---|
| KMS | Managed encryption keys integrated with services | "encrypt at rest", "key policy", "rotation", "envelope encryption" |
| CloudHSM | Single-tenant HSMs you control | "FIPS 140-3 Level 3", "PKCS#11", "sole control", "TDE" |
| External key store | KMS keys backed by your HSM outside AWS | "keys must never be stored in AWS" |
| Secrets Manager | Secrets with rotation | "rotate database credentials automatically" |
| Parameter Store | Config and simple secrets | "cheapest", "no rotation needed" |
| ACM | Public TLS certificates, auto-renewed | "HTTPS on ALB/CloudFront", "free certificates" |
| Private CA | Private certificate authority | "internal TLS", "mTLS", "device certificates", "Roles Anywhere trust anchor" |
Identity
| Service | For | Clue |
|---|---|---|
| Identity Center | Workforce SSO to accounts and apps | "corporate IdP", "many accounts", "permission sets", "SCIM" |
| Cognito | Customer identities for apps | "mobile app sign-up", "social login", "JWT" |
| Verified Permissions | In-app authorization in Cedar | "fine-grained app permissions", "policy store" |
| Directory Service | Active Directory in or connected to AWS | "domain join", "trust with on-premises AD" |
| IAM Roles Anywhere | Non-AWS workloads get temporary credentials | "on-premises servers", "X.509 certificates", "no long-term keys" |
| STS | Temporary credentials | "AssumeRole", "cross-account", "external ID" |
Preventive vs detective vs proactive controls
| Type | Examples | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Preventive | SCPs · RCPs · Declarative policies · permissions boundaries · S3 Block Public Access · VPC Block Public Access | The action can't happen |
| Proactive | CloudFormation Hooks (Control Tower proactive controls) · CloudFormation Guard in CI · Access Analyzer custom policy checks | Bad configuration is rejected before deployment |
| Detective | Config rules · Security Hub CSPM · GuardDuty · Access Analyzer | You find out after the fact |
| Responsive | Config remediation · EventBridge + SSM Automation / Lambda · Security Hub automation rules | It gets fixed automatically |
Immutability and recovery
| Feature | Protects | Clue |
|---|---|---|
| S3 Object Lock (compliance) | S3 object versions, even from root | "WORM", "regulatory retention", "SEC 17a-4" |
| S3 Object Lock (governance) | S3 object versions, admins can override | "prevent accidental deletion", "allow override" |
| Backup Vault Lock | Recovery points in a vault | "backups can't be deleted early" |
| Logically air-gapped vault | Backups restorable from another account | "recover if the account is compromised", "ransomware" |
| Versioning + MFA Delete | Old object versions | "recover overwritten objects" |
| Data Lifecycle Manager | EBS snapshot schedules and copies | "automate EBS snapshots" |
AI security parts
| Feature | Job | Clue |
|---|---|---|
| Bedrock Guardrails | Prompt attacks, PII, denied topics, grounding, Automated Reasoning | "block jailbreaks", "mask PII in responses", "hallucinations" |
| Bedrock model invocation logging | Record prompts and responses | "audit what users asked the model" |
bedrock:GuardrailIdentifier condition | Force every call to use the approved guardrail | "enforce centrally" |
| SageMaker AI network isolation | No outbound network from training/inference containers | "model must not call the internet" |
| Amazon Q Business | Enterprise assistant that respects source ACLs | "employees see only documents they're allowed to" |
| Amazon Q Developer | Security scanning in the IDE | "find vulnerabilities while coding" |
| AI services opt-out policy | Stop AWS AI services using your content | "content must not improve AWS models" |
Services A–Z
Service flashcards
Read the situation, name the service in your head, then reveal.
Quick review: "If you see this, pick that"
Detection
Incident response
Infrastructure security
Identity and access management
Data protection
Governance
Acronyms A–Z
Every acronym used in this guide. Type any of them in the search box to jump here.